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Abstract 
 
To tackle the ubiquitous cybersecurity threats, a few 
countries have enacted legislation to criminalize the 
production, distribution and possession of computer 
misuse tools. Consequently, online hacker forums, 
which enable the provision and dissemination of 
malicious cyber-attack techniques among potential 
hackers or technology-savvy users, are subject to 
censorship. This project examines the mixed impacts 
of online hacker forum censorship on users’ 
contribution to protection discussion through a 
natural experiment with large-scale content analysis. 
We find that while the enforcement indeed reduced the 
discussion on malicious cyber-attacks, the discussion 
on cybersecurity protection could increase or 
decrease in different scenarios. The rationale is that 
while the online hacker forum censorship imposes risk 
to the discussion of malicious attacks, it also reduces 
the potential benefit from discussing protection issues. 
Policy implications are discussed. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Cyber-attack refers to any offence against the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer 
data and systems and can range from installing 
malware on a computers, intruding into or illegally 
controlling computer information systems to 
attempting to destroy the infrastructure of entire 
nations.  Cyber-attacks cost the global economy 
billions of dollars every year, and are growing 
concerns for businesses and governments around the 
world [16,21]. One reason for the flooding of 
cybersecurity violation events is the low cost to 
acquire the necessary tools and programs to commit 
cyber-attacks. For example, the online hacker forums 
enable the communication among potential hackers or 
technology-savvy users and provide the free-to-access 
and rich resources on malicious attack techniques. To 
tackle the ubiquitous cybersecurity threats, a few 
countries have enacted legislation to criminalize the 
production, distribution and possession of computer 
misuse tools. Table 1 provides a list of such countries. 
Consequently, online hacker forums with the 
provision and dissemination of malicious attack 
techniques, are subject to censorship. Banning 
malicious attack discussion is supposed to increase 
the knowledge barrier and to reduce the chance 
of committing cyber-attacks. 
Table 1. Countries with legislation on the 
production/distribution/possession of 
computer misuse tools 
Country 
Legislations on the production 
/distribution /possession of 
computer misuse tools 
Canada Criminal code, Article  
China Criminal Law 
Latvia 
Criminal code, Amended Section 
244. 
Italy Penal code, Amended Article 615 
Lithuania 
Criminal code, Amended Article 
198 
Qatar Penal code, Part 3 Article 382  
Republic of Moldova Telecommunication Law, Article 66  
Russian Federation Criminal Code, Act 273 and 138.1 
Saint Lucia Criminal Code, Article 330, 331  
 
 While few opponents would rise against the 
regulation on disseminating bomb making information, 
the same rationale may not be expected to malicious 
attack discussion. The ambiguous opinions towards 
the dissemination of malicious attack techniques are 
rooted in the distinctions between conventional crimes 
and cyber-attacks. First, malicious attack discussion 
plays a dual role in protection and attack [29]. For 
example, the port scanners and exploit tests are 
powerful instruments for network administrators to 
detect their information system vulnerabilities, and at 
the same time the detected vulnerabilities could be 
exploited by hackers to commit cyber-attacks. In fact 
the endless combat between cyber-attacks and its 
countermeasures becomes the driving force for the 
advancement of defensive technology. Second, the   
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community, as the perpetrators against cyber security, 
from its origins in 1960s, were considered the “Heroes 
of the Computer Revolution” [20]. Through decades 
of migration, hacker community have become a 
congregation of the “white hats”, “black hats” and 
“gray hats”. The white hats have commitment to 
information freedom, mistrust of authority, and 
heightened dedication to meritocracy. The black hats 
are engaged with forbidden actions including mockery, 
spectacle, and transgression. The gray hats participate 
in both black and white domains [10]. Thus it is lack 
of a clear moral judgment about hackers. Lastly, the 
loss rendered by cyber-attacks is largely intangible and 
hard to measure. All of the aforementioned factors 
contribute to the debate on online hacker forum 
censorship. In this study we address a straightforward 
question: 
What is the impact of banning malicious attack 
discussion on users’ contribution to protection 
discussion in online hacker forums? 
The answer to this question is not straightforward 
given the intertwining of contesting and conquering 
between malicious attack discussion and protection 
discussion. Banning malicious attack discussion is 
supposed to increase the knowledge barrier and to 
reduce the chance of committing cyber-attacks. On the 
other side, lack of the alert from malicious attack 
discussion, forum users may become less interested or 
poorly motivated to attend protection discussion. If 
banning malicious attack discussion discourages the 
contribution on protection discussion and thus reduces 
the public’s awareness of potential threats and 
technical measures against malicious attack, its role in 
deterring cybersecurity threats may not be well 
justified. Instead banning malicious attack discussion 
on online hacker forums may force the black hat back 
to the underground hacker communities, thus making 
the potential cybersecurity threats invisible to the 
public and hence hard to be tackled. 
We investigate the research question in the context 
of the Chinese online hacker forums. On Feb 28,2009, 
China government enacted the Amended Article 285 
in the  Criminal Law which states that “Whoever 
provides programs or tools specially used for intruding 
into or illegally controlling computer information 
systems, or whoever knows that any other person is 
committing the criminal act of intruding into or 
illegally controlling a computer information system 
and still provides programs or tools for such a person 
shall, if the circumstance is serious, be punished under 
the preceding paragraph”.1 Following the enforcement 
of this amendment, the Internet security agencies in 
China conducted intensive censorship to online hacker 
                                                 
1 http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2009-02/28/content_1246438.htm 
forums. Forum administrators also removed 
considerable amount of posts containing malicious 
techniques and regulated the forums with strict rules 
and surveillance on user-generated contents. As a 
result, the number of posts on malicious attack in each 
of our studied two forums has significantly dropped 
from then onwards. We examine the change of the 
number of posts on protection before and after the 
enforcement of the Amended Article 285 at the forum 
aggregate level and the user group level. Innovative 
text mining and content classification techniques have 
been applied into the data processing. 
We find that while the enforcement indeed reduced 
the discussion on malicious cyber-attacks, the 
discussion on cybersecurity protection could increase 
or decrease in different scenarios. The rationale is that 
while banning discussion the online hacker forum 
censorship imposes risk to the discussion of malicious 
attacks, it also reduces the potential benefit from 
discussing protection issues.  
This paper is organized as follow. Section 2 is 
about the related literatures. Section 3 introduces the 
context of this study. In section 4, we describe our 
classification method. Section 5 reports the empirical 
analysis and estimation results. Section 6 concludes 
the study with discussion about implication and 
limitation.  
 
2. Related literature 
 
This study is related to three streams of research in 
the literature including hacker behavior, Internet 
regulation, and hacker forum text analysis. 
 
2.1. Hacker behavior 
 
Hackers can be classified as white hats or black 
hats based partly on their intents and the potential 
criminal nature of their activities. Individuals who 
attempt to hack into computer systems and ruin the 
systems are referred to as black hat hackers; 
individuals who attempt to protect the computer 
systems are known as ethical hackers or white hat 
hackers [27].The earliest white hats can be traced back 
to the late 1960s with the belief that computers can be 
the basis for beauty and a better world [20]. Following 
the growth of white hats, black hats evolved from the 
telephone phreakers to the computer hackers [10]. 
However, the white hats and black hats are not so 
distinct from each other. White hat hackers could 
simulate the attacks used by black hat hackers in order 
to test potential security risks and understand how to 
defend against them [9]. Black hat hackers can be 
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recruited to develop security software or to provide IT 
security consultancy service [4]. And there exist the 
gray hat hackers who lie between the white and black 
hats, committing to security by hacking into the 
political territory [10]. Hence, the moral judgment 
about hacker is ambiguous. 
Hacker’s moral ambiguity is consistent with their 
communications in online hacker forums. The 
participants in hacker forums discuss issues about both 
malicious attack and protection. They may post step-
by-step guide to help others conduct malicious attacks, 
e.g. SQL injection, web exploits, and decryption [6]. 
Exploit tools or malwares are also available as 
attachments, e.g. the Dirt Jumper DDos attack, 
keyloggers and crypters [25]. They also discuss 
technologies, methodologies and practices about 
detecting, preventing and tracking the black hats to 
protect information assets. 
Being aware of the moral ambiguity among 
hackers, to the best of our knowledge, no previous 
work has addressed the interdependency between 
white hats and black hats. 
 
2.2. Internet regulation 
 
A number of countries have enacted policies to 
regulate the Internet which enables the generation, 
communication and dissemination of both benign and 
malicious content. They block access to the Internet 
content and websites which are harmful to the public 
[2]. For instance, the contents about hate speech are 
restricted by the France government [5]. Websites 
threatening national security are blocked in South 
Korea and Pakistan [11]. The creation of hacking tools 
is considered a criminal offense in the United 
Kingdom and Germany.  On Feb 28, 2009, China has 
enacted the Amended Article 285 of its Criminal Code 
which criminalizes the provision of hacking tools or 
programs. The neutrality pertaining to information 
technology leads to the debate on regulation. For 
example, encryption has the potential to further 
massive terrorism and facilitate greater security in 
communication. Thus some of the law enforcement 
communities advocate its criminalization but others 
stand by accessing to the technology [18]. In our case, 
hackers are two-sided, playing positive and negative 
roles in cybersecurity, and sharing both malicious 
attack and protection knowledge. Due to law 
enforcement, some black hats may quit from the 
censored online hacker forums. As a result, forum 
users may become less interested in contribution 
simply due to the shrinking group size [30]. And lack 
of the alert from malicious attack discussion, forum 
users may become less interested or poorly motivated 
to attend protection discussion. It’s unclear whether 
forbidding malicious attack discussion forfeits their 
contribution to protection discussion [18]. Hence, it is 
important to figure out what impact banning malicious 
attack discussion could have on the contribution to 
protection discussion. 
 
2.3. Hacker forum text analysis 
 
Different from the underground hacker 
communication channel, i.e., ICQ, where the 
observations are limited by personal contacts, hacker 
forums are the publicly accessible hacker communities 
where the vast amount of user-generated content can 
be investigated in a longitudinal base. However, unlike 
online product review where the user-generated 
content is structured or semi-structured, the 
unstructured and diversified contents in hacker forums 
impose great challenge to quantitative analysis. Most 
of the relevant text analysis studies are focused on 
uncovering the dark side of the mysterious group. 
Abbasi et al. [1] use an interaction coherence analysis 
(ICA) framework to identify expert hackers in forums. 
Samtani et al. [25] apply classification and topic 
modeling techniques to investigate the functions and 
characteristics of assets in hacker community. In order 
to have better understanding of hacker terms and 
concepts, Benjamin et al. [8] utilize recurrent neural 
network language models (RNMLM) to model 
language.  To the best of our knowledge, no previous 
work has distinguished the hacker forum posts by 
hackers’ intents of either malicious attacks or 
protection. Thus posts on protection are mostly 
ignored.  
In this study, we classify posts into three categories, 
malicious-attack, protection, or the irrelevant through 
supervised machine learning. With human-labeled 
training datasets, we use n-gram, weight, together with 
information gain [26, 24] to generate and select 
features, then feed them into Naive Bayes and SVM 
classifiers. We choose Naive Bayes and SVM as the 
classifiers because they are classical and can be 
adopted in many occasions. SVM also often reported 
best performance in many previous online text 
classifications [31]. At last, classifiers with good 
precision and recall rate are used to label the remaining 
posts. 
 
3. Context and Theory Discussion  
 
3.1. Hacker forums  
 
With the consideration on popularity, established 
period, the theme of the forum and major topics, we 
choose forum A and forum B among the most 
representative hacker forums in China as the research 
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subjects, and investigate the impact of banning 
malicious attack discussion on participants’ 
contribution to protection discussion. According to the 
web traffic ranking by Alexa.com, Forum A and 
Forum B are ranked the second and third respectively 
in the Chinese hacking category. 2 The No.1 forum, 
established in 2008, cannot provide a balanced 
longitudinal dataset with enough time periods before 
and after the enforcement of the Amended Article 285. 
Forum A was established in March 2001, one of the 
earliest and most famous hacker forums in China. It 
aims to cultivate hackers with advanced knowledge 
and techniques and hence has long enjoyed a great 
popularity. Different from forum A, Forum B, 
established in December 2002, aims to raise people’s 
awareness of cyber security and to provide related 
services. Posts on either malicious attacks or 
protection are found in both forums, perhaps due to the 
ambiguous roles of hackers. But the different value 
propositions have resulted in more discussion on 
malicious attacks in Forum A and more discussion on 
protection in Forum B.  
 
3.2. The Amended Article 285 in the Criminal 
Law of People’s Republic of China 
 
On Feb 28,2009, Chinese government enacted the 
Amended Article 285 in the  Criminal, which states 
that “Whoever provides programs or tools specially 
used for intruding into or illegally controlling 
computer information systems, or whoever knows that 
any other person is committing the criminal act of 
intruding into or illegally controlling a computer 
information system and still provides programs or 
tools to such a person shall, if the circumstances are 
serious, be punished under the preceding paragraph”. 
The enforcement of this amendment has generated 
widespread and substantial impacts on the online 
hacker forums in China. First, the Internet security 
agencies in China conducted intensive censorship to 
online hacker forums. The chief administrator of 
forum A was even arrested and sentenced to five-year 
prison.   Second, to comply with this law, many hacker 
forum administrators implemented a series of 
regulations to forum participants, including deleting 
posts on malicious attack, promulgating more rigorous 
content censorship and alerting  those participants who 
disseminated malicious attack discussion and tools in 
online forums. Given the dual usage of hacking 
techniques and the ambiguous incentives of hackers, it 
is not clear how the law enforcement against malicious 
attack discussion will indirectly affect the participants’ 
contribution to protection discussion.     
                                                 
2 In Alexa.com, hacking is listed as one of the sub-categories in Computers. Ranking was assessed on April 5, 2016 
3.3. Theory Discussion 
 
We use the volume and ratio of posts to measure 
forum users’ contribution on discussion, as the ratio 
can offset any change in the overall contributions 
across the whole forum. Our hypotheses are based on 
three main effects resulted from the law enforcement. 
Displacement effect. Displacement effect in this 
study means that forum users who would have 
attended discussion on malicious attack may instead 
choose to discuss protection issues. This is related to 
the communication and technical interests pertaining 
to the participants in the hacker forums. First, 
meritocracy is emphasized in their active area [12,13] 
and hackers acquire reputation which accumulated 
from their activity levels and post quality [7]. For 
successful hackers, they do feel the need to brag and 
share their accumulated knowledge [12, 17]. Second, 
hackers are technology savvy while both hacking and 
protection share the same technical foundation. 
Considering the risk of discussing malicious attacks, 
they may convert discussing hacking knowledge into 
discussing protection knowledge, and continue to 
launch posts on protection, in order to keep active and 
accumulate their reputation in forums. As a result, 
banning malicious attack discussion may lead to more 
posts on protection.  
New user effect. As the hacker forums become 
more protection oriented, it would attract new users 
who are interested in protection techniques. As a result, 
there would be more white hats in hacker forums than 
before. Thus the amount of posts on protection and the 
ratio of posts on protection to all posts would increase. 
Both displacement effect and new user effect 
support the positive effect of banning malicious 
attacks discussion on the contribution of protection 
discussion. Thus we expect the number of posts on 
protection increases after the law enforcement and the 
extent of increase is larger than the other irrelevant 
posts in the forum. 
Precaution reduction effect. Posts on malicious 
attack may raise the precaution awareness and 
stimulate the discussion on protection issue. The law 
enforcement deters forum users from discussing 
malicious attack, and a large number of posts on attack 
were deleted by forum administrators. This may 
reduce the attention and interests on protection issues. 
Therefore, the volume and ratio of posts on protection 
may decrease.  
Hence, what impact could banning malicious 
discussion and tools have on posts on protection is a 
pending question subject to empirical test.  
5622
  
 
4. Data processing 
4.1. Definition of intents 
For the purpose of our research, we classify the 
intents of posts into three categories. The first is 
“malicious attack”, which means the post contains 
malicious attack intent, expressing a tendency to 
attack others; the second is “protection”, which is 
about measures of protecting personal or company 
(information, account) from being attacked by 
malicious hackers; the third is “irrelevant”, for those 
neither related to “malicious attack” nor to 
“protection”.  Through a thorough study on hacker 
forum posts, we summarize the typical topics of each 
category in Table 2. After defining the specific 
contents in each category, text classification is needed 
to label each post accordingly. 
Table 2. Typical Topics and Post Examples 
Malicious attacks 
Typical Topics 
footprinting and reconnaissance, scanning networks, 
enumeration, system hacking, Trojans and back- doors, 
viruses and worms, sniffers, social engineering, denial of 
service, session hijacking, hacking web servers, hacking web 
applications, SQL injection, hacking wireless networks, 
evading IDS, IPS, firewalls, and honeypots, buffer overflow, 
and cryptography 
Post Examples 
Postid=52972, “Recently, I scanned out a ROOT blank 
command of a host MSSQL, how can I get the host’s 
administrator right” 
Postid=3045218,  “Numerous ways to surf internet for free in 
internet bar”!!!!! 
Protection 
Typical Topic 
How to defense from hackers’ attacks, including installation 
and setting of firewall, closing certain ports 
Post Examples 
Postid=2754943, “Help….My computer has been infected by 
virus.” 
Postid=3228449, “Share: How to protect IP from being stolen” 
Irrelevant 
Typical Topic 
Other contents that are not relevant to attack or defense. For 
example, basic computer operation, chatting, advertisement 
Post Examples 
Postid=26837, “How to run DOS under windows 2000 ” 
Postid=2808442, “Good news! Tencent is celebrating 6th 
anniversary now, 6 digit QQ number can be applied for free. 
Apply for it soon!” 
 
4.2. Text classification 
The whole text classification process is presented 
in Figure 1. Since a leading post represents the topic 
of a whole thread, we constrained our samples to all of 
the leading posts in the two forums. Two human 
annotators, also as the co-authors of this study, 
independently labeled 18833 leading posts out of the 
140802 leading posts in Forum A and 5459 leading 
posts out of the 28317 leading posts in Forum B.  Both 
of them including one postgraduate and one senior 
undergraduate, are majored in information systems, 
and have received more than six-month training on the 
domain knowledge of information security and hacker 
communities before working on labeling. Their inter-
rater agreement, using kappa statistics, is 0.778 for 
Forum A and 0.92 for Forum B, which suggests 
sufficient inter-rater reliability. We then use the 
labeled dataset as the training dataset and testing 
dataset. 
The next step is to preprocess these unstructured 
texts. Unlike English, Chinese does not have space 
between words. So we first need to segment each 
sentence into tokens via Rwordseg provided in R. 
Meanwhile, stop words, useless in this classification 
task, are removed. We then use N-grams to generate 
more features. To select features, we give higher 
weights on post title and use information gain to filter 
out less important features while reserving those that 
are more useful in discriminating posts [15, 19]. Then 
these feature sets are used to train Naive Bayes and 
SVM classifiers. Following classifier training, we use 
10-fold cross validation to evaluate the performance of 
the classification. Finally, for each sub forum, 
classifiers with the best performance are applied to 
labelling the remaining posts. 
Figure1. Hacker forum text classification 
process 
The classification is implemented by Rapidminer 
with performance reported. For Forum A, the average 
precision, recall and F1-measure of three classes are 
86.36%, 80.11% and 82.73% respectively; For forum 
B, the average precision, recall and F1-measure of 
three classes are 77.83%, 71.23% and 74.24% 
respectively. Since no previous study has classified the 
intents of posts in hacker forums, no existing 
benchmark could be applied. Referring to a recent 
study which identified users’ intents in online health 
forum using word vector and SVM in text 
classification [28], their average precision, recall and 
F1-measure of all classes are 49.77%, 48.44% and 
48.78% respectively. 
 
5. Model and empirical analysis 
 
5.1. Model and description 
 
We address our research question at both aggregate 
level and user level. Model 1 at the aggregate level 
5623
  
investigates how the daily volume (ratio) of posts on 
protection (PoP) changes with the law enforcement 
(the banning of malicious attack discussion).  
𝑃𝑜𝑃𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐸𝑡 + +𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 
                  +𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                                   (1) 
where t denotes date t, 𝑃𝑜𝑃𝑡  is the daily amount of PoP 
in a forum , 𝐸𝑡  indicates the enforcement of the 
amended Article 285. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡  is a vector 
consisting of the daily number of post users and the 
daily number of new users, to control the impact of 
forum group size on post contribution [30]. 
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡  captures the time trend. 𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑡  is the first 
order lag of the dependent variable. Excluding ratios, 
all variables are converted to the logarithmic form. 
The Heckman model is employed to analyze the 
impact of the law enforcement on the ratio of 
protection posts. We calculate the ratio as the amount 
of PoP over the total amount of PoP and irrelevant 
posts. The malicious attack posts are excluded from 
the denominator as they have been seriously 
manipulated following the law enforcement. Further 
the first stage of the Heckman model can capture the 
impact of the law enforcement on the probability of 
posting or not posting. In order to correct the selection 
bias due to no leading post in a forum at some days, 
we calculate the inverse Mills ratio based on the 
estimation result in the first step, and incorporate it 
into stage 2. The Heckman model is specified as 
following, 
𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒈𝒆𝟏: 𝐼𝑠𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 +  
                    𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡     (2) 
𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒈𝒆𝟐: 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜_𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐸𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 +  
                                       𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑆𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡    
 (3) 
In equation (2),  𝐼𝑠𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡  is a dummy variable that 
equals to 1 if at least one post was posted at day t, and 
0 otherwise.  𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑡  is the first order lag of the total 
amount of  posts. In equation (3), 𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑆𝑡  is a vector of 
the first order lag of the daily amount of PoP and the 
total amount of posts.  Other variables have the same 
meanings as in equation (1).  
Model 2 at user level investigates the change of the 
users’ contribution to protection posts before and after 
the law enforcement. We constrain the subjects to 
users who joined the forum before Feb 28, 2009 and 
assort users with the same joining date into one group.3 
To ensure the symmetric time window before and after 
the enforcement date for each group, we drop groups 
who joined the forum before 2005. We finally get 1842 
groups for Forum A and 1217 groups for Forum B. For 
each group, their time windows before and after the 
law enforcement equal to the number of days between 
their joining date and the enforcement date. For 
                                                 
3 We group users by joining dates because the size of individual level data is too big. There are 159626 unique users in forum A and 37307 
unique users in forum B. In our next stage of this research, we will conduct individual-level analysis. 
example, for a group of users who joined the forum in 
Jan 1, 2009, the number of days before the law 
enforcement is 58 days. Thus we only check their 
contributions within 58 days after the law enforcement. 
We check how the number of PoP by group i change 
before and after the enforcement date using a fixed-
effect model, 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑃𝑜𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐸𝑡+𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡            (4) 
where t equals to 0 for the time window before the 
enforcement date and 1 otherwise.  We use the other 
groups’ total amount of posts/replies on protection and 
total amount of irrelevant posts/replies to control for 
any impact due to the forum size and peer influence. 
Same as model 1, when the dependent variable is the 
ratio of PoP, the Heckman model is applied. 
𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒈𝒆𝟏: 𝐼𝑠𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡(5)  
𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒈𝒆𝟐: 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑃𝑜𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐸𝑡 +
                                                         𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏𝑖𝑡        (6) 
We derive the inverse Mills ratio from stage 1 and 
incorporate it into stage 2.  In stage 2, besides those 
control variables in stage 1, vector 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡  
also includes the amount of group users and the length 
of time window to control for the effects due to group 
size and time interval. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 report 
summary statistics for main variables used in model 1 
and model 2 respectively.  
5.2. Forum aggregate level analysis 
 
The columns 1-3 and 4-6 in Table 4 report the 
regression results of model1 for forum A and forum B 
respectively. In Column 1 and Column 4, the 
coefficient of the law enforcement for Forum A is 
positive and significant while it is negative and 
significant for Forum B. These results seem 
conflicting with each other but are reasonable given 
the different positioning of Forum A and Forum B. As 
introduced in Section 3.1, Forum A aims to cultivate 
hackers with advanced knowledge and techniques 
while Forum B aims to raise people’s awareness of 
cyber security and provide related services. Hence 
banning the malicious discussion increases the 
perceived risk for the black hats in Forum A but at the 
same time reduces the perceived benefit for the white 
hats in Forum B. Consequently, the displacement 
effect explains the positive and significant coefficient 
of the enforcement indicator for Forum A while the 
precaution reduction effect explains the negative and 
significant coefficient of the enforcement indicator for 
Forum B.  
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For Heckman model, both of the results in Column 
3 and Column 6 show that the ratio of the PoP 
increases significantly after the law enforcement. This 
suggests that banning malicious attack discussion 
generates relatively more positive effect on protection 
discussion than discussion on issues irrelevant with 
attack and protection. However, referring to Column 2, 
the coefficient of the enforcement indicator is negative 
and significant while it is negative and insignificant in 
Column 5. This difference further suggests the distinct 
responses  of users in Forum A compared to those in 
Forum B. Combining the results in Columns 1,2,4 and 
5, it shows after the law enforcement, users in Forum 
A which consisted of more black hats relative to White 
hats, choose to either keep mute or discuss protection 
issues. Differently, in Forum B which consisted of 
more white hats relative to black hats, users may keep 
posting but the total number of PoP reduced. 
5.3. User group level analysis 
By splitting users into groups based on joining date, 
we are able to examine the change in amount and ratio 
of PoP at group level, in particular for old users who 
joined the forums before the enforcement. Table 5 
reports the regression results of model 2. Generally, 
the results of model 2 are consistent with that of model 
1 presented in Table 4, i.e. the coefficients of the 
enforcement indicator in columns 1-5 of Table 5 are 
significant, with the same sign as the corresponding 
specifications reported in columns 1-4 of Table 4. The 
main difference is that the negative effects of banning 
malicious attack discussion on general discussion, in 
particular for discussion on protection,  becomes more 
salient in model 2, e.g., columns 2,6,7 and 8 in Table 
5. These evidences together with results in columns 2, 
5 and 6 of Table 4 further clarify that the increasing 
ratio of PoP as reported in column (6) of model 1 is 
mainly due to the contribution from new users who 
joined Forum B after the enforcement.   
To explain the distinct results from data in Forum 
A and Forum B, we conduct a paired t-test to compare 
the daily number of PoP posted by old and new users 
in Forum A and Forum B respectively. Table 6 shows 
that on average, users in Forum B contribute more PoP 
than users in Forum A, which suggests the systematic 
difference of user profiles in the two forums.  Further, 
the mean number of PoP posted by new users in Forum 
B is much more than that of PoP posted by old users, 
which further suggests that the positioning of Forum 
B effectively attracts more white hats than forum A 
 
6. Conclusion and implications 
Combining the statistics in Table 6 with the 
regression outcomes, we can conclude that while 
banning malicious attack discussion imposes risk to 
the discussion of malicious attacks, it also reduces the 
potential benefit from discussing protection. Thus the 
black-hat hackers may respond to the enforcement by 
switching to discussing protection topics; while the 
white-hat hackers become less motivated to discuss 
protection issues. As a result, the impact of online 
hacker forum censorship is a mix which depends on 
user profile in each forum. 
Internet censorship is a very important and 
sensitive issue to policy makers. This study shows that 
the bad guy and good guy may not be always 
substitutes to each other. Instead they are 
interdependent and their boundaries may become 
ambiguous due to technology neutrality and the ethical 
ambiguity pertaining to hacker community. In 
particular, we find that banning malicious attack 
discussion discourages the contribution on protection 
discussion by the white hats. On the other side, to 
reduce the probability of being punished, the black 
hats may approach the underground hacker 
communities for discussing malicious attacks. Thus 
the potential cybersecurity risk imposed by malicious 
cyber-attack discussion does not really reduce but just 
becomes less observable. This is an even worse 
situation since the public become less alerted about the 
potential threats and are also less aware about the 
technical countermeasures against malicious attacks. 
Hence, the role of the online hack forum censorship in 
deterring cybersecurity threats may not be well 
justified. Instead of banning malicious attack 
discussion in online hacker forums, our study proposes 
that the authorities should encourage more discussion 
about the disclosure of cyber-attack threats and their 
countermeasures. Banning the bad guys does not 
attract and help good guys, but pushes the devil to the 
dark. 
This study can be improved through at least three 
ways. The first is to improve the performance of text 
classification through in-depth machine learning. The 
second is to broaden the coverage of hacker forums in 
order to capture any interdependence and enhance its 
generalizability. Lastly the current empirical model 
should be improved by including individual level 
analysis. 
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Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics of Model 1 
Forum Variable 
Pre-enforcement Post-enforcement 
Mean Std.dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
A 
PoP 3.651 3.428 0 20 0.983 1.405 0 16 
Ratio of PoP 0.040 0.028 0 0.194 0.032 0.049 0 0.4 
No. of  post users 369.171 121.530 0 965 293.513 185.182 0 1304 
No. of  new users 58.895 68.983 0 1222 31.058 74.453 0 2075 
Total no. of  PoP and 
irrelevant posts 
86.554 46.874 0 259 28.728 20.770 0 123 
No. of days 2191 
B 
PoP 4.517 6.983 0 67 5.044 5.384 0 50 
Ratio of PoP 0.444 0.322 0 1 0.276 0.181 0 1 
No. of  post users 35.144 43.913 0 173 86.625 41.985 0 289 
No. of  new users 7.326 13.183 0 250 13.914 20.062 0 274 
Total no. of  PoP and 
irrelevant posts 
13.128 19.099 0 132 17.448 13.457 0 119 
No. of days 1900 
Table 4. The Estimation Result of Model 1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Forum A 
 
Forum A 
Stage 1 of 
Heckman 
Forum A 
Stage 2 of 
Heckman 
Forum B 
 
Forum B 
Stage 1 of 
Heckman 
Forum B 
Stage 2 of 
Heckman 
VARIABLES No. PoP Is there any post? Ratio of PoP No. PoP Is there any post? Ratio of PoP 
 
Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics of Model 2 
Forum Variable Pre-enforcement Post-enforcement 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
A No. of PoP by group i 3.318 5.827 0.000 148.000 0.194 1.299 0.000 32.000 
 No. of days 928.838 536.729 1.000 2067.000 928.838 536.729 1.000 2067.000 
 No. of  new joined users 51382.390 42310.450 52.000 
117386.00
0 
28065.040 9504.100 63.000 42209.000 
 No. of group users 63.726 63.489 1.000 1222.000 63.726 63.489 1.000 1222.000 
 
No. of irrelevant posts by 
other groups 
65374.250 41430.920 48.000 
118346.00
0 
23910.240 8325.205 52.000 31491.000 
 
No. of PoP by other 
groups 
2998.267 2242.678 1.000 6117.000 850.834 275.272 1.000 1093.000 
 
No. of irrelevant replies 
by other groups 
545692.70
0 
277299.50
0 
604.000 
863592.00
0 
391994.90
0 
140379.30
0 
594.000 5257020 
 
No. of replies on 
protection  by other 
groups 
17938.680 12036.800 8.000 34119.000 6786.086 2217.158 27.000 8521.000 
 No. of groups 1842 
B No. of PoP by group i 4.198 22.303 0.000 352.000 0.472 6.299 0.000 201.000 
 No. of days 680.933 393.632 1.000 1612.000 680.933 393.632 1.000 1612.000 
 No. of new joined users 5716.440 2323.887 5.000 8328.000 10467.150 6682.378 4.000 27024.000 
 No. of group users 6.837 12.807 1.000 250.000 6.837 12.807 1.000 250.000 
 
No. of irrelevant posts by 
other groups 
8297.601 2683.673 2.000 10075.000 9239.056 6110.914 17.000 23187.000 
 
No. of PoP by other 
groups 
3995.307 1453.264 9.000 5285.000 3577.674 2162.968 10.000 7568.000 
 
No. of irrelevant replies 
by other groups 
49332.82 15094.300 56.000 58218.000 96695.570 46176.240 87.000 
170131.00
0 
 
No. of  replies on 
protection by other 
groups 
13505.490 4494.019 46.000 17269.000 20892.090 10265.840 43.000 36383.000 
 No. of groups 1217 
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The Enforcement 
indicator 
0.239*** 
(0.058) 
-1.056*** 
(0.288) 
0.038*** 
(0.009) 
-0.426*** 
(0.062) 
-0.460 
(0.371) 
0.051** 
(0.024) 
No. of  new users 0.0274* 
(0.017) 
-0.115*** 
(0.032) 
2.49e-06 
(0.002) 
-0.0236 
(0.017) 
-0.352*** 
(0.103) 
0.000755 
(0.007) 
No. of  post users 0.107*** 
(0.022) 
1.017*** 
(0.092) 
0.030*** 
(0.004) 
0.399*** 
(0.020) 
1.241*** 
(0.107) 
-0.059*** 
(0.011) 
No. of PoP at day t-1 0.215*** 
(0.021) 
 
0.0250*** 
(0.003) 
0.303*** 
(0.021) 
 
0.097*** 
(0.013) 
Total no. of posts on 
protection or irrelevant 
posts at day t-1 
 
-0.655*** 
(0.005) 
-0.060*** 
(0.004) 
 
0.193*** 
(0.058) 
-0.079*** 
(0.014) 
Linear time trend Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. 
Constant 0.707*** 
(0.133) 
0.122 
(0.405) 
0.151*** 
(0.022) 
-0.301*** 
(0.046) 
-1.634*** 
(0.163) 
0.739*** 
(0.026) 
Observations 2,191 2,191 2,191 1,900 1,900 1,900 
Adj. R-squared 0.531 0.171  0.519 0.239  
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 5. The Estimation Result of Model 2 
 
Table 6. Summary Statistics for PoP 
Forum Old Users New Users 
Mean Standard Error Mean Standard Error 
A 0.473 0.028 0.511 0.030 
B 1.254 0.067 3.428 0.117 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Forum A 
  
Forum A 
Stage 1 of 
Heckman 
Forum A 
Stage 2 of 
Heckman 
Forum A 
Stage 2 of 
Heckman 
Forum B 
  
Forum B 
Stage 1 of 
Heckman 
Forum B 
Stage 2 of 
Heckman 
Forum B 
Stage 2 of 
Heckman 
VARIABLES No. PoP  Is there any 
post? 
Ratio of PoP Ratio of PoP No. PoP  Is there any 
post? 
Ratio of PoP Ratio of PoP 
 Fixed -effect  Fixed -effect OLS Fixed -effect  Fixed -effect OLS 
Enforce law 
indicator 
1.556*** 
(0.121) 
-1.339*** 
(0.391) 
0.059*** 
(0.025) 
0.060*** 
(0.019) 
-0.925*** 
(0.143) 
-2.341** 
(0.332) 
-0.408*** 
(0.153) 
-0.365*** 
(0.110) 
No. of users in 
group i 
 
-1.120*** 
(0.212) 
 
-0.007 
(0.004) 
 
1.039*** 
(0.075) 
 
0.049* 
(0.030) 
No. of days 
 
-1.661*** 
(0.190) 
 
0.018 
(0.012) 
 
0.287 
(0.222) 
 
0.308*** 
(0.062) 
No. of PoP  by 
other groups  
-2.976*** 
(0.359) 
0.0172 
(1.051) 
-0.188** 
(0.082) 
-0.102* 
(0.052) 
-0.912*** 
(0.368) 
0.423 
(0.727) 
-0.0729 
(0.308) 
-0.157 
(0.221) 
No. of  replies on 
protection by other 
groups  
-1.978*** 
(0.271) 
-1.213 
(0.946) 
0.286*** 
(0.0669 
0.138*** 
(0.0462) 
-0.548 
(0.520) 
-1.985** 
(1.011) 
-0.381 
(0.398) 
0.0739 
(0.270) 
No. of irrelevant 
posts  by other 
groups 
9.449*** 
(0.460) 
3.526** 
(1.533) 
0.0837** 
(0.116) 
0.106 
(0.072) 
0.783*** 
(0.262) 
-0.962** 
(0.489) 
-0.274 
(0.227) 
-0.217 
(0.175) 
No. of irrelevant 
replies by other 
groups 
-2.855*** 
(0.334) 
-0.651 
(0.765) 
-0.269** 
(0.080) 
-0.153*** 
(0.044) 
1.032** 
(0.495) 
3.100*** 
(0.796) 
0.950** 
(0.379) 
0.192  
(0.228) 
the inverse Mills 
ratio 
  
-0.003** 
(0.002) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
  
0.020 
(0.029) 
-0.029 
(0.020) 
Constant -17.0*** -8.596*** 1.238* 0.377*** -1.705** -5.557*** -0.563 -0.405 
 (2.537) (2.369) (0.657) (0.116) (0.966) (1.483) (1.152) (0.501) 
Observations 3,684 3,684 2,960 2,960 2,434 2,434 897 897 
R-squared 0.695  0.046  0.265  0.080  
Number of groups 1,842 1,842 1,771 1,771 1,217 1,217 709 709 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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